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Vulnerable voices on fire preparedness: policy implications for emergency and 
community services collaboration 
 




An investigation of household preparedness and community connections was 
undertaken in the NSW Blue Mountains. The research employed a qualitative approach. 
Upon receiving ethical approval, interviews and focus groups with a total of 31 
vulnerable residents were recorded and transcribed. Data analysis included the manual 
coding of individual transcripts and key word queries entered into NVivo 10. Fire 
planning for community resilience within Australia focusses on property preparation 
and an emergency warning system designed to assist the evacuation decisions of 
residents. In this article we report on vulnerable residents and their preparedness for the 
October 2013 bushfires. Our findings demonstrate that the vulnerable people 
interviewed did not consider property preservation as a priority, and their knowledge 
and engagement with the warning system and evacuation procedures was limited. Of 
practical value, the research found local community services and emergency planning 
committees should collaboratively plan for vulnerable community members who are 
unable to take a very active role in preparing themselves or their dependents to face a 
bushfire or similar disaster. In addition, preparedness and warning communications 
should be devised and targeted to more clearly assist vulnerable people during the lead 
up to, and in the midst of, a disaster. 
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Introduction 
This study stems from a larger research endeavour, (names withheld). The overarching 
aim of the (title withheld) research is to determine the social support and networks of 
the most vulnerable in the community and thus inform strategies to increase community 
resilience. The study reported here is concerned with a qualitative exploration 
specifically focussed on the transcripts from interviews and focus groups with 31 
vulnerable residents from the Blue Mountains in NSW. Vulnerable residents are defined 
as meeting one or more of the following criteria: over 65 years of age, having a chronic 
illness or disability, and/or living alone. Lack of support and social connection has been 
demonstrated to increase vulnerability (Tuohy and Stephens, 2011; Forrester-Jones et 
al. 2012; Phillips et al. 2010). 
     
In the following section the events of the October 2013 fires are summarised, 
specifically in relation to vulnerable residents. The concept of ‘shared responsibility’ as 
outlined in the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) is introduced against 
the backdrop of what is meant by ‘fire preparedness’ within the Australian context.  
 
The Blue Mountains 
Located within NSW, the Blue Mountains contain 25 villages nestled in a ribbon 
development stretching across the top of a beautiful mountain ridge. The region is 
heavily forested and depends on tourism. Due to being serviced by one major arterial 
road and one main railway corridor, older, vulnerable and at risk members of the 
community face specific challenges in a disaster. These include road closures, the halt 
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of public transport and power outages, usually as a result of bushfire or severe storms. 
 
In October 2013 a military exercise sparked a fire which rapidly escalated into a threat 
for upper and mid mountain residents, eventually destroying homes in the village of Mt 
Victoria. Concurrent fires destroyed homes in Yellow Rock and Winmalee, thought to 
be started by tree branches over power lines. In all over 200 homes were destroyed with 
no immediate loss of human life. On Wednesday 23 October ‘residents who did not 
have a bush fire survival plan’ were advised to leave the Blue Mountains. All Blue 
Mountains schools were closed so that families could stay together (Curran 2013). 
Vulnerable residents who were interviewed, many of whom had no means of transport 
and limited understanding of the unfolding situation, experienced extreme personal 
stress.  
     
Within the population of approximately 80,000 residents, nearly 12,000 are over 65 
years and approximately 15,000 households are living on AUD$600 or less per week 
(ABS 2011). This represents a significant proportion of people potentially requiring 
community resources to make up for what they are unable to afford or access for 
themselves, depending on how connected they are within the broader community. In 
addition, our initial investigations revealed that vulnerable residents may not be actively 
engaged or consulted by the relevant authorities prior to or during emergency situations, 




Within the study, ‘community’ is understood in terms of physical proximity rather than 
the global internet-mediated community. Physical proximity reflects the importance of 
having assistance nearby so that a speedy response can be mobilised. The geographic 
understanding of ‘community’ is reflected within the Australian National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience, where the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ has been used to 
describe local action: 
 
Communities, individuals and households need to take greater responsibility for 
their own safety and to act on advice and other cues given to them before and on 
the day of a bushfire. (National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 2011: 3) 
 
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) sets out the agenda for shared 
responsibility and the need for all sectors of society to take responsibility in times of 
disaster, including all levels of government, business, the non-government sector and 
individuals. For individual households ‘shared responsibility’ has been interpreted as 
preparing the property and planning for evacuation (Keelty 2011; McLennan & 
Handmer 2012). To assist these activities residents are encouraged to draw on guidance, 
resources and policies of government and other sources, such as community 
organisations. The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience further states that: 
 
The disaster resilience of people and households is significantly increased by 
active planning and preparation for protecting life and property, based on an 
awareness of the threats relevant to their locality. It is also increased by knowing 
and being involved in local community disaster or emergency management 
arrangements, and for many being involved as a volunteer. (National Strategy for 




     
As communities work out ways to determine how resilient they are and what are the key 
factors in their resilience, they are also confronted with the need to recognise those who 
are unable to adequately support themselves in a disaster. The contribution of this 
research is to examine the experiences of vulnerable individuals and make 
recommendations that the authorities can implement to improve practices in relation to 
working with vulnerable members of the community. 
 
Resilience and vulnerability applied 
Santos poses the question: ‘Resilience: an innate quality or dynamic process?’ (2012: 
5).  If the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) is taken at face value, the 
Australian government believes that resilience can be grown and nurtured rather than 
viewed as something static and inherent within a community. The (withheld) researchers 
share this perspective. 
     
Untangling the web of definitions and applications of the words ‘resilience’ and 
‘vulnerability’ has resulted in a myriad of research publications and reports, many of 
which are designed to inform strategic decision-making by those tasked with planning 
and preparing for disasters (for example: Al-rousan et al. 2014; Twigg 2014; Boon 
2013; McLennan et al. 2013). Increasingly, possibly as a result of Recommendation 3 in 
the report of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (Teague et al. 2010), there 
is a focus on ‘vulnerable people’ and how to plan and prepare for them should a disaster 
situation arise. Recommendation 3 states: 
 
The State establish mechanisms for helping municipal councils to undertake local 
planning that tailors bushfire safety options to the needs of individual 
communities. In doing this planning, councils should: 
■ urgently develop for communities at risk of bushfire local plans that contain 
contingency options such as evacuation and shelter 
■ document in municipal emergency management plans and other relevant 
plans facilities where vulnerable people are likely to be situated—for example, 
aged care facilities, hospitals, schools and child care centres 
■ compile and maintain a list of vulnerable residents who need tailored advice 
of a recommendation to evacuate and provide this list to local police and 
anyone else with pre-arranged responsibility for helping vulnerable residents 
evacuate. (Teague et al. 2010: 1) 
 
     
Although Victorian in context, the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission has 
been closely read by all Australian States and Territories, with the result that 
Recommendation 3 has been variously interpreted and applied (see the discussion by 
Garlick 2015). In most instances the application involves an organisation or a person 
being ‘responsible’ and just exactly who this person or organisation is, continues to be 
worked out. This is because with responsibility comes the imperative to act. Various 
activities within the Blue Mountains stemming from Recommendation 3 have been: 
delivery of public safety lectures, open days for volunteer bushfire stations, the Red 
Cross calling house to house, and the idea of establishing and maintaining a ‘list of 




Definitions of resilience and vulnerability centre on the capacity of an individual or 
community to ‘spring back’ after the impact of an adverse situation. The less ability to 
rebound after a disaster or a challenge, the greater the vulnerability.  
 
Household preparedness 
For individual households, emergency preparedness involves knowing the risks 
particular to the community, developing an emergency plan, and having an 
emergency kit in the home containing food, water, and medical supplies to shelter in 
place for 72 hours (Levac et al. 2012: 727). According to Paton and colleagues (2008) 
household preparedness means ‘creating a defensible space around the home, cleaning 
leaves from guttering, placing metal flyscreens on windows, screening eaves, 
ensuring access to resources for extinguishing spot fires, and determining householder 
“stay or go” positions’. These measures are intended to reduce the risk of loss and 
injury, and facilitate coping with bushfire consequences, minimize damage and 
insurance costs (Paton et al. 2008: 41). Additionally, Penman et al (2013) break down 
the personal capacity component of preparedness into ‘personal ability’, ‘dependents’, 
having a ‘plan’ and then various issues relating to property structures such as fuel 
load, maintenance and landscape design.  
 
These understandings of ‘household preparedness’ are included to illustrate that, for 
most emergency services and community organisations, bushfire preparedness priorities 
revolve around physical property preparations and evacuation planning for household 
members. Other studies have found a consistent inadequacy in the household 
preparedness for predictable and regularly occurring hazards (Boon, 2015; King, 2000), 
and as Cutter and colleagues (2000) acknowledge: 
 
The degree to which populations are vulnerable to hazards is not solely dependent 
on proximity to the potential source of the threat. Social factors such as wealth 
and housing characteristics can contribute to greater vulnerability on the part of 
some population groups. (Cutter et al. 2000: 714) 
 
The focus of ‘preparedness’ in the literature and among the ‘authorities’ assumes it is 
all about the house, property, and evacuation. The research that measures household 
preparedness (and often finds inadequacies) is based on the same assumption (e.g. 
Paton et al. 2008; Penman et al. 2013; Dunlop et al. 2014; McLennan, Paton & 
Wright 2015). Cutter (2000) argues that these assumptions are inadequate and there 
are other factors that need to be taken into account when assessing vulnerability and 
how vulnerable people prioritise and prepare. The Voices of the vulnerable research is 
situated in this space and as such sought to describe the fire preparedness of 
vulnerable Blue Mountains residents, investigate their priorities and ultimately inform 
community resilience strategies.  
 
Research method 
Ethical approval for the research was provided by Charles Sturt University. Through 
focus groups, survey and interviews within a participatory action framework, the project 
drew together information from State and Federal reports, academic research, local 
support groups, community centres and community members, specifically focusing on 
the needs of vulnerable populations within the Blue Mountains. With a similar focus to 
Mutch and Marlowe, who investigated the ‘groups whose voices might not otherwise be 
heard’ (2013: 385), this particular article reports the voices of the 31 vulnerable 
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participants. The interviews and focus groups took place between August and 
November 2014.  
     
The same semi-structured questions were employed for individual interviews and focus 
groups. The questions were open-ended and focused on eliciting local day to day 
neighbourhood interactions and connections and then moved to participants’ 
expectations and experiences in an emergency situation.  
     
The interview and focus group participants were drawn from across the Blue Mountains 
of NSW. Some were survey participants from a related research project (Redshaw et al 
2015) who had filled in the accompanying consent form, while others contacted the 
researchers after either attending the research launch or local neighbourhood centres, or 
through reading of the opportunity in the council bulletin, council website or local 
newspaper article. Participants included people who identify with a mental illness or 
disability which affects their day to day activities as well as older people who lived 
alone. Eleven interviews were held with 12 participants (one couple were interviewed 
together). Three focus groups were held in Katoomba. A fourth focus group was held in 
Springwood with a carer’s group. The interviews and focus groups lasted between thirty 
minutes and an hour. 
     
Interview and focus group data was transcribed and transcripts were coded and themed 
in relation to the interview guide in the first data analysis, and then according to key 
emerging themes in the next level of data analysis. All transcripts were read multiple 
times and key words extracted. Key word queries were also run in NVivo. Participant 
comments relating to the theme of fire preparedness and experience form the core data 
for this article. 
 
Overview of Interview Participants 
During the data collection phase 12 people were individually interviewed. The 
demographic information collected is displayed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Overview of the 12 interview participants.  




Male 4 2 2 1 
Female 8 4 4 3 
 
40-65 years 5 3 2 2 
65-75 years 4 2 2  
75+    years 3 1 2 2 
 
 
Overview of Focus group participants 
Focus groups were utilised to create an informal and relaxed setting to encourage the 
participation of the more vulnerable people. In total there were 19 focus group 




Table 2. Overview of the 19 focus group participants 
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Male 7 4 1 4 
Female 12 4 8 6 
 
25-40 years 1 1 0 1 
40-65 years 9 2 5 6 
65-75 years 2 2 0 1 




Rather than quantifying the number of mentions pertaining to a word or concept, themes 
are briefly described under Results in tandem with verbatim comments (Liamputtong 
2009). The intention is to amplify the voices of the vulnerable. Consequently, the 
vocabulary in the Results section contains unquantified words such as ‘a few’, ‘most’ 
and ‘some’. The theme of ‘fire preparation and experience’ is presented in relation to: 
having a plan, what to take, where to go, fear of being labelled, official communications 
and warnings, and finally, local knowledge.   
 
Results 
Overall, the voices of the vulnerable in the interviews and focus groups demonstrate 
that fragile community connections in daily life may become serious impediments to 
preparation activities when disaster threatens. To set the scene, the following excerpt 
encapsulates the overall participant mood when recalling the bushfire event of October 
2013: 
 
What I do remember is just that highly strung energy that was going through the 
Mountains, and other neighbours that were there, so they were petrified, they had no idea 
what to do, whether to stay or to go, because their family lived a long, long, long, long 
way away. (Interview 11, lives in a block of supported accommodation flats) 
 
 
Having a fire plan  
In Australia, ‘having a fire plan’ is typically understood in terms of property 
preparations and determining the triggers for evacuation. In contrast to this generalised 
interpretation, ‘having a plan’ for most of the study participants meant something that 
was generated at the time of the disaster. They had not previously worked out what they 
would do and plans were difficult to make as they did not have much to draw on: 
 
I thought, well, what happens up here? Because I don't drive or anything, and how do I 
get out? But the bird was in the cage and I had the cat box ready and then someone said 
‘Well, you could put them all in the wheel barrow.’ (Interview 8) 
 
What would you need if there was a fire? (Interviewer) 
I don't know. (Interview 7) 
  
In general, those who owned their property were the ones most likely to have planned 
for a fire, in terms of preparing their property and working out where they would go:  
 
It was a dreadful day, and we had sort of plans in place whether to go or not. We’d done 
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everything we could to the house to look after it. (Interview 2) 
 
My fire plan is just to get (husband) and go. (FG4) 
 
I would stay because I’m quite convinced that it's the embers. I’ve got a petrol pump and 
fire hoses and 6500 litres of water. That would be emptied in 45 minutes. (Interview 9, 
male in his 80’s) 
 
Personal awareness that a proper plan was not really in place increased as the news of 
the fires spread: 
 
We always joked that we've got a plan, but we actually don't you know. I mean, I can get 
K's dogs, but that's about it. (Interview 10) 
 
Except in a few cases, ‘having a plan’ was not interpreted by participants as ‘preparing 
the property’. Rather, being prepared meant getting ready to leave, gathering valuables 
and finding transport. This could be an indication of living in supported 
accommodation, local area housing or being renters in the general property market. 
Whatever their living arrangements, concern by participants for buildings and gardens 
was not a high priority when asked about fire preparation.  
     
The research suggests that vulnerable residents in the Blue Mountains could benefit 
from community-delivered fire preparation programs which focus on lead-in time for 
preparations and a discussion around determining priorities. 
 
Whether and when to leave 
Although some participants said they would be happy to go, the option of leaving was 
not available as they had no means of transport. Most stayed in the hope that they could 
stay and would not have to go, while others were oblivious to what was happening– 
these people were in the focus groups and some lived with a great deal of support from 
parents or carers. They had not thought deeply about staying or leaving, expecting that 
someone else would just tell them what to do. As such, some participants were certain 
they would be notified and evacuated by the local volunteer fire service: 
 
Look there was some concern, but I knew that we also did have my name down with the 
fire brigade as a vulnerable person in need of evacuation if that situation arose so that, 
you know, if the worst came to the worst someone should come and get me. (FG3 
Woman, over 55 years, deaf and blind) 
 
Some were prepared, but relying on others to tell them when to leave or as a means to 
leave: 
And I was packed, ready to leave. And I had to organise my cat’s basket to take her if the 
fires came. So I had to pack food and water for her. And get all my personal papers and 
that and my medication, I had to get, plus a change of clothes. So I was already packed to 
go.  
And where were you going to go? (Interviewer) 
Just wherever they said to go. (FG1) 
 
We haven’t got a car, so we’d have to get one of the neighbours to drive us somewhere. 
(FG1) 
 
Well we saw the fires on TV…it came pretty close to the old cemetery, which is a couple 
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of blocks away. We live in local area housing, and they rang us up, they rang everybody 
in local area housing in the Mountains and they said if you did want to be evacuated we 
could arrange that. So they called us twice actually, so yeah… They just said pack all 
your stuff up and we’ll arrange for somebody to take you. (FG1)  
 
One woman in her 60s stayed an extra night because her neighbour could not leave and 
most of the area was ‘deserted’: 
 
I stayed overnight, I would have gone Tuesday night, but I didn’t because she was there. 
(Interview 3) 
 
Another was cautious and anxious, staying in her clothes all night just in case: 
 
Well, I slept in my clothing that night, yeah, when it was starting to, the back door was 
there and I did pack a bit of stuff up. (FG1) 
 
Others had made some preparations, but were still unclear about what they would do: 
 
Well I just packed some clothes in the car. (FG2) 
 
So all I have to do is pack some clothes and take my cat with me. I rang up my brother 
and I said, ‘No the fire’s not near me.’ Yeah, I know what to do and if anyone’s got a 
spare car, ‘Hey can I hop in it?’ (FG2) 
 
A letter was dropped to houses in the Lithgow area and one person with a mental illness 
indicated that she would follow instructions, but may need help working out what they 
are: 
 
A letter put in your letter box. And for us to be ready to leave, where to assemble and, 
you know… If you hear a door knock you’ve got to be ready to be packed, I can read it, 
but if I don’t understand I just ask my mum.  (FG1) 
 
For others it was difficult to work out how pressing the issue was for them: 
 
I just thought they were a bit keen because I didn’t see any smoke in the sky through the 
whole time. (FG1) 
 
One woman in her 80s had made plans which she then failed to enact, while her 
husband was determined to stay and defend. She said: 
 
I had myself packed up ready to go and when the time came I couldn't feel brave enough 
to take myself down to my daughter’s. We had two cars. I got all uptight and G [husband] 
was determined to stay. (Interview 9) 
 
The research found that a lack of transport options and only a vague sense of where they 
could go impeded evacuation for many. It was also not clear whether and under what 
circumstances evacuation for them was necessary as none were living in areas under 
immediate threat. A formal plan to mobilise local community transport options could be 
considered in such circumstances. 
 
What to take 
A few participants had placed important documents and valuables where they could 
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easily access them, while every person within the carer’s focus group had thought about 
the person they cared for and for some this extended to considering the important 
documents and valuables of the person they cared for: 
 
I know exactly what I want- my husband, I suppose, a little bit of jewellery, a bag… And 
my box, my box has got my bits in it, I know that, and if I can I pick up the quilt and I 
throw all the photos in it, I just go, pick it up, take it into the car. That’s it, that’s it. That’s 
my fire plan. (FG4) 
 
I have a briefcase where I’ve got my marriage certificate, death certificates and insurance, 
everything, and important jewellery; that’s already packed. I’m out, yeah. I’m not going 
to be a menace to everyone else. [laughs] (FG4) 
 
My partner has a basket thing where she puts all her little bits of electronic hardware; 
that’s got things backed up from the computer, etc., etc. So it’s grab that, grab the 
animals, get out. (FG4) 
 
Taking pets was also a strong theme: 
 
You know, your pets and things and just certain personal items. (FG1) 
 
We packed up the animals and had a Noah’s ark on wheels down to the parents’ place in 
Sydney with chickens, guinea pigs, cat, dogs, birds. (FG4) 
 
The idea of preparing in haste and setting aside important valuables was a strong theme. 
Just exactly what was considered ‘valuable’ varied between participants. For many it 
was their pets. Community education programs could focus on helping people decide 
what to consider valuable and how best to preserve and protect whatever was identified. 
 
Where to go 
Despite most participants indicating that to leave was the main option, there was a 
general lack of clarity in all four focus groups and in some interviews about where 
people would go if they were evacuated: 
 
I honestly don't know. I would hope that somebody would come over and say ‘Look do 
you need help getting out, jump in the car with all your pets’ and off we go. But I don't 
even know where our safe area is or if there is a safe area in Hazelbrook. (Interview 8) 
 
And in the Carers Focus Group a number of people commented: 
 
-Well, you’ve got to go up to Hazelbrook or something like that, up to the school or the 
scout hall, like you go past the fire station. 
-You should check with the fire brigade and see. We actually had a, something in our 
mail. 
-Well no, they did I think suggest that because at the fire station there wouldn’t be enough 
room for everybody. 
-No, but usually a school or a hall or a club. 
-It’s the main shopping centre as far as I know. (FG4) 
 
Another felt certain about where he needed to go if he had to leave his home: 
 
Just showground, you know, very clean place. You stay there and that’s the meeting 
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place, showground. (FG K1) 
 
Considering that the interviews took place in the months following the fires, it is clear 
that most participants still had little or no idea about where they should or could 
evacuate to. This is an important point for emergency planners and media 
communications to consider when determining how best to assist vulnerable community 
members. 
 
Official communications and warnings 
There was some reference to the local volunteer fire brigade, in NSW called the Rural 
Fire Service (RFS), and the advantage of having the headquarters located nearby: 
 
We've got the RFS at the end of the street. They're not going to let their shed burn down. 
(Interview 10) 
 
I kept on smelling this smoke and thinking ‘Oh, they must be doing burning off.’ Because 
there was no warning about it, it wasn't on anything. (Interview 10) 
 
A participant living close to other vulnerable people spoke about the physical 
inaccessibility of the community information meetings: 
 
I remember at the time it was getting pretty dangerous, they had community information 
sessions. A lot of people are elderly and they have chronic health conditions, so it’s not a 
matter of ‘they can just walk there’.  They don’t really have the money to get a taxi there 
either, they need their taxi money for emergencies and stuff like that.  So yeah, I think in 
terms of dissemination of information, yeah, I don’t think it was that great. (Interview 11) 
 
The overriding message broadcast to all Blue Mountains residents is understood by this 
participant: 
 
 So the information I got was ‘If you don’t feel safe, just go, just leave the Mountains, 
that’s the best thing that you can do’.  (Interview 11) 
 
Organisers of community information sessions should consider not only the location of 
the meetings and transport for those with no means of travel, but also arrange how to 
communicate and update the chronically ill or elderly, and others who are unfit to travel. 
 
Local knowledge 
The region of the Blue Mountains is characterised by restricted road access options, due 
to only one route across the mountain. Each village is similarly characterised by a 
myriad of no-through roads. The benefit of this local knowledge was highlighted by 
participants, some of whom had put a great deal of thought into their geographical 
location: 
 
And they like you to go early because we’re right at the end of Abc Drive and there’s 
only one road, and most places there is only one road out anyway. (FG4) 
 
Other streets would cop it before here. I would stay here right through because I think 
first of all the wind would be going the wrong way and a fire coming up here would be 
more or less finger type fire, it wouldn't be driven by wind. Even the ‘77 fire came over 
the top and around and it can’t do that now because there’s houses there. (Interview 9, 




I mean this house has been here since 1940, and there's been huge big fires. There was the 
‘62... all the old timers say that the fire stops when it comes up from Lawson and races up 
the Valley 'cause of the Terrace Falls Road. It just stops there. It doesn't jump 'cause the 
gap is too wide. (Interview 10) 
 
Others were aware of the occupants (or lack of) in their locality. Where one participant 
lived there were many holiday rentals which were irregularly occupied: 
 
They were going to start an inventory of each street as to who lived where. I don’t think 
they ever completed it, but in our street for example, when there’s so many empty homes, 
when you really are looking to see that the street’s been emptied because of fire, it would 
have been a good project. (Interview 2, female aged in 70s) 
 
Vulnerable participants demonstrated a considered understanding of the limitations of 
their immediate locality. This could be capitalised on when determining a ‘known’ as 
the launch point for community fire planning initiatives.  
 
The research provides evidence that some community members are not able to fully 
participate in their own disaster planning and response activities. 
 
 
Policy implications for emergency and community services 
collaboration 
The research provides evidence of the need for collaboration between local emergency 
services and community organisations when planning for vulnerable residents in 
disaster situations.  
 
The formal relationship between local emergency services and community organisations 
in relation to disaster arrangements is legislated by the State Emergency and Rescue 
Management Act 1989 (SERM Act 1989). The Act establishes State, Regional and 
Local Emergency Management Committees, overseen by the Minister for Police, 
Minister for Emergency Services. Our research relates to the local level, where the 
Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) is “responsible for the preparation 
of plans in relation to the prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from 
emergencies in the local government area for which it is constituted” (SERM Act 1989: 
29/1).  
 
The structure of the LEMC is challenged by the findings of this research. At present, 
LEMC are comprised of two groups, one being the decisions makers located under the 






Figure 1: Structure of a Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC)  
  
 
The divide created by siloing the Emergency Services from the Observers on the LEMC 
is being challenged by the actions of organisations intent on implementing the directives 
of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR 2011), which endorses a 
‘shared responsibility’ approach to disaster planning. As demonstrated by our previous 
study in the NSW Blue Mountains (Redshaw et al. 2015), prior to the October 2013 
fires most Non-Government Organisations (NGO’s) were unaware that there was such a 
thing as a local emergency management plan (called an EMPLAN). Conversely, most 
emergency services were unaware of the valuable resources and local knowledge 
NGO’s had to contribute to disaster arrangements, especially in relation to vulnerable 
residents. Our previous research demonstrates that prior to the 2013 fires local NGO’s 
were not represented as Observers on the LEMC, although larger generic organisations 
such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army were invited.  
 
In this article we suggest a more integrated and connected approach to local disaster 
planning would have circumvented much of the angst experienced by vulnerable 
residents during the October 2013 fires. We base this on the intimate local knowledge 
which neighbourhood centres and similar local NGO’s have of local vulnerable 
Chairperson  
(Council General 





NSW Police Force 
Fire & Rescue NSW 










Local Health District 
Roads & Maritime 
Sydney Trains 
St John’s Ambulance 
Surf Lifesaving 









residents, demonstrated by their capacity to connect us with vulnerable participants for 
the research reported in this article. We acknowledge that the formal integration of the 
two elements of the LEMC will require a massive paradigm shift in relation to a number 
of issues, including approaches to decision making and determining how and who 
within the community participates. 
 
Although a place-specific qualitative exploration, the research lends itself for 
extrapolation to assist other similar communities. Therefore, the following 
recommendations move from the particular characteristics of the NSW Blue Mountains 
to highlight broader implications, designed to inform emergency services and 
community organisations operating where pockets of particularly vulnerable people are 
located on the urban-wildland interface.  
 
Recommendation 1: Clarify the roles and responsibilities of community organisations 
and emergency services during periods of disaster 
Within the Local EMPLAN there are three parts for Local Emergency Management 
Committees (LEMC) to complete: Administration, Community Context, and 
Restricted Operational Information. One purpose of the Local EMPLAN is to “clearly 
define roles and responsibilities of responders and community partners”. The 
Guideline states “The community profile assists the LEMC to understand the diverse 
needs, values and priorities of local community and its characteristics within the 
broader environment. This information is critical to inform planning and emergency 
operations.” This quote illustrates the problematic divide between emergency services 
and community organisations created by the separation of Emergency Services and 
Observers on the LEMC in that the current policy provisions in NSW are framed 
within an emergency service narrative where the community is to be ‘consulted’ and 
perhaps ‘engaged’, but not actually participate in the formulation of disaster plans. 
Irvin and Stansbury (2004) argue that the effort required to reach a consensus is an 
obstacle to ‘citizen participation in decision making’. This highlights the magnitude 
of the paradigm shift required to establish mechanisms for genuine community 
participation and fulfil the mandate of the NSDR (2011) of ‘shared responsibility’. 




Recommendation 2: Reframe the current thinking around individual responsibility for 
preparedness and readiness, to ensure that those who are unable to implement plans or 
engage in such activities are supported 
A paradigm shift incorporating the community in the devising of local disaster plans 
will require the commitment of funding and resources from both the emergency and 
community sector. This commitment would enable continual participation. It could 
also provide a continuation of knowledge and lessons learned, typically lost when   
recovery workers leave the area when their contracts expire, usually after two years. 
As a start towards this endeavour, various Blue Mountains NGO’s, such as local 
neighbourhood centres, have made building individual and community resilience a 
part of their core business (Katoomba Neighbourhood Centre Annual Report 2015-
2016, p.25).  
 
Recommendation 3: Use various community development strategies to ensure 
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household fire preparedness and generate a sense of shared responsibility within 
neighbourhoods  
An important aspect to the problem of defining ‘resilience’ is the blurring of 
boundaries between individuals, communities and the environment. Interested parties, 
such as researchers, community services and various government organisations, are 
endeavouring to measure and explain resilience (for example Bergstrand et al. 2014; 
Gibbs et al. 2013; Sherrieb et al. 2010; Kirmeyer et al. 2009; Paton and Johnston 
2001). The difficulty of striving for commonality of purpose and definition is 
illustrated when the natural and built location is determined to be ‘vulnerable to fire’. 
This is because, although residents may consider themselves well prepared and 
resilient, for the emergency services the community status remains ‘vulnerable to fire’ 
due to its topographical features. 
 
The ‘Voices of the vulnerable’ research indicates that, whatever the definition, actions 
to increase community resilience must be a collaborative effort between residents, 
local community organisations and the emergency services. Other researchers, such as 
Akama and colleagues (2014: 277) have highlighted how essential this collaboration 
is through their work on the importance of social networks in the communication of 
disaster risk and subsequent warning messages. Cowup (2008: 19), although writing 
about domestic fires, stresses that ‘A partnership approach helps ensure that a range 
of community agencies engage with key fire safety messages for the benefit of their 
clients’. Cowup's comment may equally be applied to the threat of natural hazards. 
This is because in both situations it is the local community organisations who are 
most likely to be in contact with vulnerable community members, while the 
emergency services have the fire-preparedness content which needs to be conveyed. 
Taking a ‘shared responsibility’ approach, it is the galvanisation and purposeful 
strengthening of these emergency and community connections which are vital to the 
protection and assistance of the vulnerable.  
 
Recommendation 4: Address the issue of transport for the more vulnerable and 
isolated, especially in relation to emergency meetings and evacuation  
Transport is a major issue for vulnerable people. Not having a place to go, and no 
means to leave, were the main reasons for not leaving the NSW Blue Mountains 
during the October 2013 fires. The overwhelming tendency of participants was to 
remain and see what happens, mainly due to not envisaging alternative options. In 
addition, ‘Emergency preparedness planning needs to take into account the age-
related needs of older adults with regards to the personal and social resources 
available to them’ (Tuohy & Stephens 2011: 15).  
     
Within Australia the expectation of an official ‘rescue’ for individual households is 
gradually diminishing as people engage with the concept of shared responsibility and 
rise to the challenge of making their own household fire preparations and plan for 
possible evacuation. For the most vulnerable amongst the community this message 
does not resonate in quite the same way, as there is a dependence on the closest 
community connections to be the most likely sources of assistance, and this places a 
large burden on neighbourly responsibility.  It is a hit or miss situation for the 
vulnerable, with their safety often depending on who they know. In some situations it 
is left to chance whether a neighbour remembers a person who is vulnerable or living 
on their own. The physical presence of a person with a warning message or offer of 
assistance is likely to have greater impact than messages relayed through social media 
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or SMS. Thus, for some people, someone does have to physically arrive and knock on 
the door, especially if there is no phone connectivity and the power is out. We 
recommend that local community organisations, such as neighbourhood centres and 
local emergency services, work collaboratively to devise ways of identifying people 
who are going to be affected by smoke, electricity outages, cessation of public 
transport, and those who do not have the resources to cope with these kinds of 
situations. Simply compiling a list of vulnerable people and messaging them will not 
be enough. As exemplified by Gray-Graves and colleagues (2011), being able to 
assist those who are vulnerable contributes to the overall resilience of the whole 
community. 
 
    
Recommendation 5: Advocate for change in policy to ensure that in times of declared 
disaster, community members with pets can access public transport without fear of 
penalty 
The general assumption that being prepared for bushfire is about property preparation 
and evacuation procedures was missed by most vulnerable people in our study, as they 
had a much more immediate understanding of what was important to them. Their 
understanding tended to be motivated by the immediacy of the crisis rather than by prior 
preparations or planning. We recommend that the starting point for community fire 
preparedness with vulnerable people needs to take into account and begin at the point of 
their priorities, most commonly personal relationships and possessions- including 
medications, a means of travel, and ways of moving partners and pets. Interestingly, 
Thompson and colleagues (2014: 24) reframe the increased vulnerability which pet 
ownership may bring to become a ‘protective factor for natural disaster survival’. This 
is because pet ownership is a likely motivation towards taking action toward personal 
survival. We recommend that during times of declared disaster pets are permitted to 
travel in all forms of public transport.  
 
Conclusion 
Age, disability, chronic illness, and socio-economic conditions are all factors 
contributing to the social marginalisation of vulnerable people. In these situations it is 
not only willingness to act that is important in the face of disaster, it is also differences 
in the capacity and varying abilities of individuals and/or households to access 
resources, which needs to be taken into account by local community organisations and 
emergency services involved in warning, evacuation and response activities. Identifying 
vulnerable people within the community who are most under resourced, lack 
community connection, social participation and support in their everyday lives and 
linking them within their community is identified as a major factor of importance for 
enhanced community resilience. The existing strengths and capacities of vulnerable 
people need to be recognised and acknowledged by local community organisations 
through providing assistance for their self-identified needs. These may be as diverse as 
irrational fears, worry over lack of finances to meet emergency disaster needs, and 
transport for daily living (author names withheld). 
 
This article sought to voice the experiences and fire preparedness of 31 vulnerable 
residents in relation to the October 2013 NSW Blue Mountains Bushfires. The findings 
emphasise the need for adjustment in the preparation expectations placed on vulnerable 
people because some are incapable of planning effectively for themselves. 
Recommendations were generalised. In order to encourage timely and effective fire 
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preparation by and for vulnerable residents, the research indicates a common operating 
definition of ‘shared responsibility’ for local community organisations and emergency 
services is needed. We also call for a more holistic involvement of the local community 
in the determination of local disaster arrangements, meaning a reformulation of the 
composition and broadening of mission of the LEMC. We suggest the level and roles of 
community participation in the disaster domain currently occupied by the emergency 
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